Source code for keystone.token.providers.common

# Copyright 2013 OpenStack Foundation
#
# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
# not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
# a copy of the License at
#
#      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
#
# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
# WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
# License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
# under the License.

from oslo_log import log
from oslo_serialization import jsonutils
import six
from six.moves.urllib import parse

from keystone.common import controller as common_controller
from keystone.common import dependency
from keystone.common import utils
import keystone.conf
from keystone import exception
from keystone.federation import constants as federation_constants
from keystone.i18n import _
from keystone import token
from keystone.token import provider


LOG = log.getLogger(__name__)
CONF = keystone.conf.CONF


@dependency.requires('catalog_api', 'resource_api', 'assignment_api',
                     'trust_api', 'identity_api')
[docs]class V2TokenDataHelper(object): """Create V2 token data."""
[docs] def v3_to_v2_token(self, v3_token_data, token_id): """Convert v3 token data into v2.0 token data. This method expects a dictionary generated from V3TokenDataHelper.get_token_data() and converts it to look like a v2.0 token dictionary. :param v3_token_data: dictionary formatted for v3 tokens :param token_id: ID of the token being converted :returns: dictionary formatted for v2 tokens :raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: If a specific token type is not supported in v2. """ token_data = {} # Build v2 token v3_token = v3_token_data['token'] # NOTE(lbragstad): Version 2.0 tokens don't know about any domain other # than the default domain specified in the configuration. domain_id = v3_token.get('domain', {}).get('id') if domain_id and CONF.identity.default_domain_id != domain_id: msg = ('Unable to validate domain-scoped tokens outside of the ' 'default domain') raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) token = {} token['expires'] = v3_token.get('expires_at') token['issued_at'] = v3_token.get('issued_at') token['audit_ids'] = v3_token.get('audit_ids') token['id'] = token_id if 'project' in v3_token: # v3 token_data does not contain all tenant attributes tenant = self.resource_api.get_project( v3_token['project']['id']) # Drop domain specific fields since v2 calls are not domain-aware. token['tenant'] = common_controller.V2Controller.v3_to_v2_project( tenant) token_data['token'] = token # Build v2 user v3_user = v3_token['user'] user = common_controller.V2Controller.v3_to_v2_user(v3_user) if 'OS-TRUST:trust' in v3_token: v3_trust = v3_token['OS-TRUST:trust'] # if token is scoped to trust, both trustor and trustee must # be in the default domain. Furthermore, the delegated project # must also be in the default domain msg = _('Non-default domain is not supported') if CONF.trust.enabled: try: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(v3_trust['id']) except exception.TrustNotFound: raise exception.TokenNotFound(token_id=token_id) trustee_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( trust_ref['trustee_user_id']) if (trustee_user_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) trustor_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( trust_ref['trustor_user_id']) if (trustor_user_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project( trust_ref['project_id']) if (project_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) token_data['trust'] = { 'impersonation': v3_trust['impersonation'], 'id': v3_trust['id'], 'trustee_user_id': v3_trust['trustee_user']['id'], 'trustor_user_id': v3_trust['trustor_user']['id'] } if 'OS-OAUTH1' in v3_token: msg = ('Unable to validate Oauth tokens using the version v2.0 ' 'API.') raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) if 'OS-FEDERATION' in v3_token['user']: msg = _('Unable to validate Federation tokens using the version ' 'v2.0 API.') raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) # Set user roles user['roles'] = [] role_ids = [] for role in v3_token.get('roles', []): role_ids.append(role.pop('id')) user['roles'].append(role) user['roles_links'] = [] token_data['user'] = user # Get and build v2 service catalog token_data['serviceCatalog'] = [] if 'tenant' in token: catalog_ref = self.catalog_api.get_catalog( user['id'], token['tenant']['id']) if catalog_ref: token_data['serviceCatalog'] = self.format_catalog(catalog_ref) # Build v2 metadata metadata = {} metadata['roles'] = role_ids # Setting is_admin to keep consistency in v2 response metadata['is_admin'] = 0 token_data['metadata'] = metadata return {'access': token_data}
@classmethod
[docs] def format_token(cls, token_ref, roles_ref=None, catalog_ref=None, trust_ref=None): audit_info = None user_ref = token_ref['user'] metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] if roles_ref is None: roles_ref = [] expires = token_ref.get('expires', provider.default_expire_time()) if expires is not None: if not isinstance(expires, six.text_type): expires = utils.isotime(expires) token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') if token_data: token_audit = token_data.get( 'access', token_data).get('token', {}).get('audit_ids') audit_info = token_audit if audit_info is None: audit_info = provider.audit_info(token_ref.get('parent_audit_id')) o = {'access': {'token': {'id': token_ref['id'], 'expires': expires, 'issued_at': utils.isotime(subsecond=True), 'audit_ids': audit_info }, 'user': {'id': user_ref['id'], 'name': user_ref['name'], 'username': user_ref['name'], 'roles': roles_ref, 'roles_links': metadata_ref.get('roles_links', []) } } } if 'bind' in token_ref: o['access']['token']['bind'] = token_ref['bind'] if 'tenant' in token_ref and token_ref['tenant']: token_ref['tenant']['enabled'] = True o['access']['token']['tenant'] = token_ref['tenant'] if catalog_ref is not None: o['access']['serviceCatalog'] = V2TokenDataHelper.format_catalog( catalog_ref) if metadata_ref: if 'is_admin' in metadata_ref: o['access']['metadata'] = {'is_admin': metadata_ref['is_admin']} else: o['access']['metadata'] = {'is_admin': 0} if 'roles' in metadata_ref: o['access']['metadata']['roles'] = metadata_ref['roles'] if CONF.trust.enabled and trust_ref: o['access']['trust'] = {'trustee_user_id': trust_ref['trustee_user_id'], 'id': trust_ref['id'], 'trustor_user_id': trust_ref['trustor_user_id'], 'impersonation': trust_ref['impersonation'] } return o
@classmethod
[docs] def format_catalog(cls, catalog_ref): """Munge catalogs from internal to output format. Internal catalogs look like:: {$REGION: { {$SERVICE: { $key1: $value1, ... } } } The legacy api wants them to look like:: [{'name': $SERVICE[name], 'type': $SERVICE, 'endpoints': [{ 'tenantId': $tenant_id, ... 'region': $REGION, }], 'endpoints_links': [], }] """ if not catalog_ref: return [] services = {} for region, region_ref in catalog_ref.items(): for service, service_ref in region_ref.items(): new_service_ref = services.get(service, {}) new_service_ref['name'] = service_ref.pop('name') new_service_ref['type'] = service new_service_ref['endpoints_links'] = [] service_ref['region'] = region endpoints_ref = new_service_ref.get('endpoints', []) endpoints_ref.append(service_ref) new_service_ref['endpoints'] = endpoints_ref services[service] = new_service_ref return list(services.values())
@dependency.requires('assignment_api', 'catalog_api', 'federation_api', 'identity_api', 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api')
[docs]class V3TokenDataHelper(object): """Token data helper.""" def __init__(self): # Keep __init__ around to ensure dependency injection works. super(V3TokenDataHelper, self).__init__() def _get_filtered_domain(self, domain_id): domain_ref = self.resource_api.get_domain(domain_id) return {'id': domain_ref['id'], 'name': domain_ref['name']} def _get_filtered_project(self, project_id): project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project(project_id) filtered_project = { 'id': project_ref['id'], 'name': project_ref['name']} if project_ref['domain_id'] is not None: filtered_project['domain'] = ( self._get_filtered_domain(project_ref['domain_id'])) else: # Projects acting as a domain do not have a domain_id attribute filtered_project['domain'] = None return filtered_project def _populate_scope(self, token_data, domain_id, project_id): if 'domain' in token_data or 'project' in token_data: # scope already exist, no need to populate it again return if domain_id: token_data['domain'] = self._get_filtered_domain(domain_id) if project_id: token_data['project'] = self._get_filtered_project(project_id) project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project(project_id) token_data['is_domain'] = project_ref['is_domain'] def _populate_is_admin_project(self, token_data): # TODO(ayoung): Support the ability for a project acting as a domain # to be the admin project once the rest of the code for projects # acting as domains is merged. Code will likely be: # (r.admin_project_name == None and project['is_domain'] == True # and project['name'] == r.admin_project_domain_name) admin_project_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_name admin_project_domain_name = CONF.resource.admin_project_domain_name if not (admin_project_name and admin_project_domain_name): return # admin project not enabled project = token_data['project'] token_data['is_admin_project'] = ( project['name'] == admin_project_name and project['domain']['name'] == admin_project_domain_name) def _get_roles_for_user(self, user_id, domain_id, project_id): roles = [] if domain_id: roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_domain( user_id, domain_id) if project_id: roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_user_and_project( user_id, project_id) return [self.role_api.get_role(role_id) for role_id in roles]
[docs] def populate_roles_for_federated_user(self, token_data, group_ids, project_id=None, domain_id=None, user_id=None): """Populate roles basing on provided groups and project/domain. Used for federated users with dynamically assigned groups. This method does not return anything, yet it modifies token_data in place. :param token_data: a dictionary used for building token response :param group_ids: list of group IDs a user is a member of :param project_id: project ID to scope to :param domain_id: domain ID to scope to :param user_id: user ID :raises keystone.exception.Unauthorized: when no roles were found """ def check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id): # User was granted roles so simply exit this function. if roles: return if project_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to project %(project_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'project_id': project_id} elif domain_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'domain_id': domain_id} # Since no roles were found a user is not authorized to # perform any operations. Raise an exception with # appropriate error message. raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) roles = self.assignment_api.get_roles_for_groups(group_ids, project_id, domain_id) roles = roles + self._get_roles_for_user(user_id, domain_id, project_id) # remove duplicates roles = [dict(t) for t in set([tuple(d.items()) for d in roles])] check_roles(roles, user_id, project_id, domain_id) token_data['roles'] = roles
def _populate_user(self, token_data, user_id, trust): if 'user' in token_data: # no need to repopulate user if it already exists return user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user(user_id) if CONF.trust.enabled and trust and 'OS-TRUST:trust' not in token_data: trustor_user_ref = (self.identity_api.get_user( trust['trustor_user_id'])) trustee_user_ref = (self.identity_api.get_user( trust['trustee_user_id'])) try: self.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled( trustor_user_ref['domain_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustor domain is disabled.')) try: self.resource_api.assert_domain_enabled( trustee_user_ref['domain_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.TokenNotFound(_('Trustee domain is disabled.')) try: self.identity_api.assert_user_enabled(trust['trustor_user_id']) except AssertionError: raise exception.Forbidden(_('Trustor is disabled.')) if trust['impersonation']: user_ref = trustor_user_ref token_data['OS-TRUST:trust'] = ( { 'id': trust['id'], 'trustor_user': {'id': trust['trustor_user_id']}, 'trustee_user': {'id': trust['trustee_user_id']}, 'impersonation': trust['impersonation'] }) filtered_user = { 'id': user_ref['id'], 'name': user_ref['name'], 'domain': self._get_filtered_domain(user_ref['domain_id'])} token_data['user'] = filtered_user def _populate_oauth_section(self, token_data, access_token): if access_token: access_token_id = access_token['id'] consumer_id = access_token['consumer_id'] token_data['OS-OAUTH1'] = ({'access_token_id': access_token_id, 'consumer_id': consumer_id}) def _populate_roles(self, token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust, access_token): if 'roles' in token_data: # no need to repopulate roles return if access_token: filtered_roles = [] authed_role_ids = jsonutils.loads(access_token['role_ids']) all_roles = self.role_api.list_roles() for role in all_roles: for authed_role in authed_role_ids: if authed_role == role['id']: filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], 'name': role['name']}) token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles return if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: # If redelegated_trust_id is set, then we must traverse the # trust_chain in order to determine who the original trustor is. We # need to do this because the user ID of the original trustor helps # us determine scope in the redelegated context. if trust.get('redelegated_trust_id'): trust_chain = self.trust_api.get_trust_pedigree(trust['id']) token_user_id = trust_chain[-1]['trustor_user_id'] else: token_user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] token_project_id = trust['project_id'] # trusts do not support domains yet token_domain_id = None else: token_user_id = user_id token_project_id = project_id token_domain_id = domain_id if token_domain_id or token_project_id: filtered_roles = [] if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: # First expand out any roles that were in the trust to include # any implied roles, whether global or domain specific refs = [{'role_id': role['id']} for role in trust['roles']] effective_trust_roles = ( self.assignment_api.add_implied_roles(refs)) # Now get the current role assignments for the trustor, # including any domain specific roles. assignment_list = self.assignment_api.list_role_assignments( user_id=token_user_id, project_id=token_project_id, effective=True, strip_domain_roles=False) current_effective_trustor_roles = ( list(set([x['role_id'] for x in assignment_list]))) # Go through each of the effective trust roles, making sure the # trustor still has them, if any have been removed, then we # will treat the trust as invalid for trust_role in effective_trust_roles: match_roles = [x for x in current_effective_trustor_roles if x == trust_role['role_id']] if match_roles: role = self.role_api.get_role(match_roles[0]) if role['domain_id'] is None: filtered_roles.append(role) else: raise exception.Forbidden( _('Trustee has no delegated roles.')) else: for role in self._get_roles_for_user(token_user_id, token_domain_id, token_project_id): filtered_roles.append({'id': role['id'], 'name': role['name']}) # user has no project or domain roles, therefore access denied if not filtered_roles: if token_project_id: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to project %(project_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'project_id': token_project_id} else: msg = _('User %(user_id)s has no access ' 'to domain %(domain_id)s') % { 'user_id': user_id, 'domain_id': token_domain_id} LOG.debug(msg) raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) token_data['roles'] = filtered_roles def _populate_service_catalog(self, token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust): if 'catalog' in token_data: # no need to repopulate service catalog return if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: user_id = trust['trustor_user_id'] if project_id or domain_id: service_catalog = self.catalog_api.get_v3_catalog( user_id, project_id) token_data['catalog'] = service_catalog def _populate_service_providers(self, token_data): if 'service_providers' in token_data: return service_providers = self.federation_api.get_enabled_service_providers() if service_providers: token_data['service_providers'] = service_providers def _populate_token_dates(self, token_data, expires=None, issued_at=None): if not expires: expires = provider.default_expire_time() if not isinstance(expires, six.string_types): expires = utils.isotime(expires, subsecond=True) token_data['expires_at'] = expires token_data['issued_at'] = (issued_at or utils.isotime(subsecond=True)) def _populate_audit_info(self, token_data, audit_info=None): if audit_info is None or isinstance(audit_info, six.string_types): token_data['audit_ids'] = provider.audit_info(audit_info) elif isinstance(audit_info, list): token_data['audit_ids'] = audit_info else: msg = (_('Invalid audit info data type: %(data)s (%(type)s)') % {'data': audit_info, 'type': type(audit_info)}) LOG.error(msg) raise exception.UnexpectedError(msg)
[docs] def get_token_data(self, user_id, method_names, domain_id=None, project_id=None, expires=None, trust=None, token=None, include_catalog=True, bind=None, access_token=None, issued_at=None, audit_info=None): token_data = {'methods': method_names} # We've probably already written these to the token if token: for x in ('roles', 'user', 'catalog', 'project', 'domain'): if x in token: token_data[x] = token[x] if bind: token_data['bind'] = bind self._populate_scope(token_data, domain_id, project_id) if token_data.get('project'): self._populate_is_admin_project(token_data) self._populate_user(token_data, user_id, trust) self._populate_roles(token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust, access_token) self._populate_audit_info(token_data, audit_info) if include_catalog: self._populate_service_catalog(token_data, user_id, domain_id, project_id, trust) self._populate_service_providers(token_data) self._populate_token_dates(token_data, expires=expires, issued_at=issued_at) self._populate_oauth_section(token_data, access_token) return {'token': token_data}
@dependency.requires('catalog_api', 'identity_api', 'oauth_api', 'resource_api', 'role_api', 'trust_api')
[docs]class BaseProvider(provider.Provider): def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): super(BaseProvider, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) self.v3_token_data_helper = V3TokenDataHelper() self.v2_token_data_helper = V2TokenDataHelper()
[docs] def get_token_version(self, token_data): if token_data and isinstance(token_data, dict): if 'token_version' in token_data: if token_data['token_version'] in token.provider.VERSIONS: return token_data['token_version'] # FIXME(morganfainberg): deprecate the following logic in future # revisions. It is better to just specify the token_version in # the token_data itself. This way we can support future versions # that might have the same fields. if 'access' in token_data: return token.provider.V2 if 'token' in token_data and 'methods' in token_data['token']: return token.provider.V3 raise exception.UnsupportedTokenVersionException()
[docs] def issue_v2_token(self, token_ref, roles_ref=None, catalog_ref=None): if token_ref.get('bind') and not self._supports_bind_authentication: msg = _('The configured token provider does not support bind ' 'authentication.') raise exception.NotImplemented(message=msg) metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] trust_ref = None if CONF.trust.enabled and metadata_ref and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) token_data = self.v2_token_data_helper.format_token( token_ref, roles_ref, catalog_ref, trust_ref) token_id = self._get_token_id(token_data) token_data['access']['token']['id'] = token_id return token_id, token_data
def _is_mapped_token(self, auth_context): return (federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER in auth_context and federation_constants.PROTOCOL in auth_context)
[docs] def issue_v3_token(self, user_id, method_names, expires_at=None, project_id=None, domain_id=None, auth_context=None, trust=None, metadata_ref=None, include_catalog=True, parent_audit_id=None): if auth_context and auth_context.get('bind'): # NOTE(lbragstad): Check if the token provider being used actually # supports bind authentication methods before proceeding. if not self._supports_bind_authentication: raise exception.NotImplemented(_( 'The configured token provider does not support bind ' 'authentication.')) # for V2, trust is stashed in metadata_ref if (CONF.trust.enabled and not trust and metadata_ref and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref): trust = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) if CONF.trust.enabled and trust: if user_id != trust['trustee_user_id']: raise exception.Forbidden(_('User is not a trustee.')) token_ref = None if auth_context and self._is_mapped_token(auth_context): token_ref = self._handle_mapped_tokens( auth_context, project_id, domain_id) access_token = None if 'oauth1' in method_names: access_token_id = auth_context['access_token_id'] access_token = self.oauth_api.get_access_token(access_token_id) token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( user_id, method_names, domain_id=domain_id, project_id=project_id, expires=expires_at, trust=trust, bind=auth_context.get('bind') if auth_context else None, token=token_ref, include_catalog=include_catalog, access_token=access_token, audit_info=parent_audit_id) token_id = self._get_token_id(token_data) return token_id, token_data
def _handle_mapped_tokens(self, auth_context, project_id, domain_id): user_id = auth_context['user_id'] group_ids = auth_context['group_ids'] idp = auth_context[federation_constants.IDENTITY_PROVIDER] protocol = auth_context[federation_constants.PROTOCOL] user_dict = self.identity_api.get_user(user_id) user_name = user_dict['name'] token_data = { 'user': { 'id': user_id, 'name': parse.unquote(user_name), federation_constants.FEDERATION: { 'groups': [{'id': x} for x in group_ids], 'identity_provider': {'id': idp}, 'protocol': {'id': protocol} }, 'domain': { 'id': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name, 'name': CONF.federation.federated_domain_name } } } if project_id or domain_id: self.v3_token_data_helper.populate_roles_for_federated_user( token_data, group_ids, project_id, domain_id, user_id) return token_data def _verify_token_ref(self, token_ref): """Verify and return the given token_ref.""" if not token_ref: raise exception.Unauthorized() return token_ref def _assert_is_not_federation_token(self, token_ref): """Make sure we aren't using v2 auth on a federation token.""" token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') if (token_data and self.get_token_version(token_data) == token.provider.V3): if 'OS-FEDERATION' in token_data['token']['user']: msg = _('Attempting to use OS-FEDERATION token with V2 ' 'Identity Service, use V3 Authentication') raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) def _assert_default_domain(self, token_ref): """Make sure we are operating on default domain only.""" if (token_ref.get('token_data') and self.get_token_version(token_ref.get('token_data')) == token.provider.V3): # this is a V3 token msg = _('Non-default domain is not supported') # domain scoping is prohibited if token_ref['token_data']['token'].get('domain'): raise exception.Unauthorized( _('Domain scoped token is not supported')) # if token is scoped to trust, both trustor and trustee must # be in the default domain. Furthermore, the delegated project # must also be in the default domain metadata_ref = token_ref['metadata'] if CONF.trust.enabled and 'trust_id' in metadata_ref: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(metadata_ref['trust_id']) trustee_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( trust_ref['trustee_user_id']) if (trustee_user_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) trustor_user_ref = self.identity_api.get_user( trust_ref['trustor_user_id']) if (trustor_user_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg) project_ref = self.resource_api.get_project( trust_ref['project_id']) if (project_ref['domain_id'] != CONF.identity.default_domain_id): raise exception.Unauthorized(msg)
[docs] def validate_v2_token(self, token_ref): self._assert_is_not_federation_token(token_ref) self._assert_default_domain(token_ref) # FIXME(gyee): performance or correctness? Should we return the # cached token or reconstruct it? Obviously if we are going with # the cached token, any role, project, or domain name changes # will not be reflected. One may argue that with PKI tokens, # we are essentially doing cached token validation anyway. # Lets go with the cached token strategy. Since token # management layer is now pluggable, one can always provide # their own implementation to suit their needs. token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') token_id = token_ref['id'] if (self.get_token_version(token_data) != token.provider.V2): # Validate the V3 token as V2 token_data = self.v2_token_data_helper.v3_to_v2_token( token_data, token_id) return token_data
[docs] def validate_non_persistent_token(self, token_id): try: (user_id, methods, audit_ids, domain_id, project_id, trust_id, federated_info, access_token_id, issued_at, expires_at) = ( self.token_formatter.validate_token(token_id)) except exception.ValidationError as e: raise exception.TokenNotFound(e) token_dict = None trust_ref = None if federated_info: # NOTE(lbragstad): We need to rebuild information about the # federated token as well as the federated token roles. This is # because when we validate a non-persistent token, we don't have a # token reference to pull the federated token information out of. # As a result, we have to extract it from the token itself and # rebuild the federated context. These private methods currently # live in the keystone.token.providers.fernet.Provider() class. token_dict = self._rebuild_federated_info(federated_info, user_id) if project_id or domain_id: self._rebuild_federated_token_roles(token_dict, federated_info, user_id, project_id, domain_id) if trust_id: trust_ref = self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) access_token = None if access_token_id: access_token = self.oauth_api.get_access_token(access_token_id) return self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( user_id, method_names=methods, domain_id=domain_id, project_id=project_id, issued_at=issued_at, expires=expires_at, trust=trust_ref, token=token_dict, access_token=access_token, audit_info=audit_ids)
[docs] def validate_v3_token(self, token_ref): # FIXME(gyee): performance or correctness? Should we return the # cached token or reconstruct it? Obviously if we are going with # the cached token, any role, project, or domain name changes # will not be reflected. One may argue that with PKI tokens, # we are essentially doing cached token validation anyway. # Lets go with the cached token strategy. Since token # management layer is now pluggable, one can always provide # their own implementation to suit their needs. trust_id = token_ref.get('trust_id') if trust_id: # token trust validation self.trust_api.get_trust(trust_id) token_data = token_ref.get('token_data') if not token_data or 'token' not in token_data: # token ref is created by V2 API project_id = None project_ref = token_ref.get('tenant') if project_ref: project_id = project_ref['id'] issued_at = token_ref['token_data']['access']['token']['issued_at'] audit = token_ref['token_data']['access']['token'].get('audit_ids') token_data = self.v3_token_data_helper.get_token_data( token_ref['user']['id'], ['password', 'token'], project_id=project_id, bind=token_ref.get('bind'), expires=token_ref['expires'], issued_at=issued_at, audit_info=audit) return token_data

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